Intergalactic Peacekeepers or Space Invaders? The Outer Space Treaty and Military Personnel on the Moon

Writer: Zachary Johnson

Editor: Ethan Hicks

Associate Editor: James Banks

I. Introduction

From NASA’s recently proposed Moon base in 2028 to a possible Chinese lunar landing before 2030,1 it seems clear that mankind is headed back to its celestial neighbor. Conflicts over Antarctica, a remote and inhospitable piece of land with competing territorial claims, show that conflict can come to outer space—but this does not need to be the case.2 Conflict could potentially come from states wishing to protect their astronauts and lunar facilities from rivals with armed personnel.3 However, history teaches us that even the mere presence of weapons can lead to conflict.4 The prospect of armed military personnel on the Moon raises questions about the legality of their hypothetical presence. The Outer Space Treaty, an international agreement for all conduct in space, largely governs human activity outside of the Earth’s atmosphere.5 Article IV of the Treaty contains a strict prohibition on the establishment of any military bases, installations, or fortifications on celestial bodies—including the Moon.6 Article IV also restricts weapons testing and military operations on celestial bodies, yet it allows the use of military personnel for scientific research or any other peaceful purposes.7 However, the Article IV prohibition on military bases and activities and its permission of military personnel for peaceful purposes may come into conflict. While the treaty permits military personnel to engage in peaceful activities, it does not explicitly define peaceful (or non-peaceful) activity.8 This ambiguity leaves an opportunity for state actors to station military personnel under the guise of peaceful activities or “protecting lunar installations,” while the actors may have much less peaceful intentions. This loophole regarding the interpretation must be addressed. Article IV should be amended to prohibit research with military applications on a celestial body. The stationing of armed military personnel on celestial bodies to provide military defense, regardless of location or purpose, should also be prohibited, even if the location is used for scientific research.

II. Limitations of Article IV

Despite Article IV prohibitions, a state may describe the presence of armed personnel as necessary for actions such as scientific research, or some other peaceful purpose.9 Article IV only permits military personnel to be used for scientific research or other peaceful purposes, prohibiting military bases, installations, fortifications, weapons testing, and military maneuvers on celestial bodies.10 The presence of military security on the Moon in any capacity violates the spirit of the Treaty because, regardless of their profession, they are primarily trained for nonpeaceful purposes. Civilian astronauts, on the other hand, usually receive limited training in the effective usage of weapons, and as such, would be more likely more cautious to use them.11 The distinction between peaceful research and military function cannot rest entirely on what a state characterizes its own activities as. The military personnel exception “for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes,” is vague enough to allow for violation of the Treaty’s purpose. Nations have differing perspectives as to what “peaceful” action entails. The United States Department of Defense, for example, interprets peaceful purposes to mean “non-aggressive and beneficial” purposes consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law.12 The People’s Republic of China, conversely, has advocated for the exclusively peaceful usage of outer space, staunchly opposing the deployment of weapons, claiming that it could transform outer space into an arena of military confrontation.13 While conceptually similar, these differing approaches demonstrate the difficulty of establishing a universal boundary between permissible military activities and prohibited militarization. When personnel are permanently stationed, armed, and specifically tasked with defending a facility against hostile forces, the facility now serves a military function by virtue of its occupants’ professions.14

The legal character and purpose of an installation is determined by its function, not by its stated purpose. If the existence of a “scientific purpose” is enough to justify the presence of military personnel, a conventional military research base could be established on the Moon in all but name. Legal analyst Anel Ferreira-Snyman observes that “if the results of the scientific research are to be employed for non-peaceful purposes, it is doubtful whether the research activities would fall within the meaning of peaceful purposes in terms of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.”15 The peaceful character of an activity cannot be plainly identified by a scientific purpose—the research’s relationship to a broader military function must be considered to fully determine its legality. The fact that a lunar scientific laboratory conducts scientific research should not legitimize research that could have military applications, regardless of what it researches or how the laboratory conducts its research.

Ferreira-Snyman also notes that states often accept military action in outer space from other nations, even as the legality of these cases must be determined on a “case-by-case basis.”16 Even if some action is found to violate the Outer Space Treaty, imposing any sort of meaningful consequence remains difficult. Military activity may be accepted in practice whether or not it is compatible with the Outer Space Treaty’s peaceful-purpose requirement simply due to enforcement limitations.17 Inconsistent enforcement of international law, along with broad language in the Treaty, could allow states to expand their military presence on the Moon while skirting accountability. Cracks in the Treaty have already appeared in Low Earth Orbit—it must be further updated to remove any ambiguity before humans return to the Moon. The provisions prohibiting military bases as well as allowing peaceful research must be read together. The legality of military personnel on the Moon should not depend on whether their presence is associated with a peaceful activity, but if their functions are consistent with the restrictions established by Article IV.

Legal researcher Georges D. Kyriakopoulos, in his chapter of Space Law (2023), details the continued efforts by the global community to prevent an arms race in space.18 Such efforts further demonstrate that the existing legal framework does not resolve issues of modern military-use questions and would strongly benefit from more robust restrictions.19 The United Nations similarly stated that “the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space.”20 If the existing framework was able to resolve these modern military-use questions, then the global community may not be making these efforts to prevent an arms race in space.

III. Conclusion

The proposed amendment to Article IV would establish a firm boundary between peaceful activities and an armed military presence, making it more difficult for states to circumvent the prohibition on military installations. Military personnel would still retain the ability to participate in peaceful scientific activities, but this would not authorize them to establish or maintain an armed defensive capability. Clarification of Article IV could give states legal expectations and could prevent conflict on the Moon. Resolving this glaring ambiguity ensures that extraterrestrial exploration depends not on promises, but rather on clearly defined international law.

  1. Lauren Low, NASA Unveils Initiatives to Achieve America’s National Space Policy, NASA (Mar. 2026) [https://perma.cc/2M3X-CF7N]. ↩︎
  2. Klaus Dodds, The Antarctic: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford Univ. Press (2012); See also Falkland Islands Dependencies (Hope Bay Incident), HC Deb (Feb. 1952) [https://perma.cc/3C46-N8HM]. ↩︎
  3. Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, The Legality of Defending National Activities on the Moon, 16 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 137, 143–45, 192–93 (2025). ↩︎
  4. Dodds, supra note 2. ↩︎
  5. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. ↩︎
  6. See id. art. IV. ↩︎
  7. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV. ↩︎
  8. Anél Ferreira-Snyman, Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, with Specific Reference to Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, 18 Potchefstroom Elec. L.J. 487, 497 (2015). ↩︎
  9. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV. ↩︎
  10. Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 8, at 498. ↩︎
  11. James Oberg, How I Stopped Cosmonauts From Carrying Guns, IEEE Spectrum (Nov. 2014) [https://perma.cc/5NXE-8KD7]. ↩︎
  12. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Law of War Manual § 14.10.4, at 956 (July 2023). ↩︎
  13. Ministry of Foreign Affs. of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, § (Preventing Weaponization of and an Arms Race in Outer Space) (2005). ↩︎
  14. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV. ↩︎
  15. Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 8, at 498. ↩︎
  16. Id. at 500. ↩︎
  17. Larry F. Martinez, Legal Regime Sustainability in Outer Space: Theory and Practice, 2 Global Sustainability e26, 1–6 (2019). ↩︎
  18. Georges D. Kyriakopoulos, Military Activities in Outer Space: Legal Aspects, in Space Law: Legal Framework for Space Activities 331 (Thomas Leclerc ed., 2023). ↩︎
  19. Id. ↩︎
  20. G.A. Res. 76/22, ¶ 2 (2021). ↩︎

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