From Commitment to Compliance: The Enforcement Failure of the International Cocoa Agreement

Writer: Alessa Cardaci

Editor: Saysia Berding

Associate Editor: Srinidhi Venkitasamy

Editor’s Note: This article examines the International Cocoa Agreement, 2010, which terminated on September 30, 2026. A successor agreement entered into force on October 1, 2026. The analysis and recommendations below address the 2010 framework and do not evaluate the successor agreement.

I. Introduction

Approximately 1.56 million children were engaged in child labor in cocoa production in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire during the 2018 to 2019 growing season, with an estimated 1.48 million in dangerous working conditions.1 The persistence of child labor within the international cocoa industry exposes a fundamental weakness in international governance: The existence of recognized legal standards does not guarantee meaningful consequences for their violation. Despite decades of international cooperation and corporate initiatives intended to improve labor conditions, hazardous child labor remains prevalent in cocoa-producing countries such as Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.2 This persistence raises critical questions concerning the capability of international agreements to translate broadly accepted labor protections into enforceable obligations.

The International Cocoa Agreement (ICA) was developed to promote cooperation between cocoa-producing and cocoa-consuming countries, primarily through economic stabilization, market transparency, and sustainable development.3 However, its emphasis on economic coordination fails to establish a comprehensive mechanism for holding governments accountable for persistent child labor. This is despite the fact that protections were established by the International Labour Organization’s Minimum Age Convention,4 requiring states to implement procedures against child labor.5

The International Cocoa Agreement’s reliance on voluntary cooperation and economic coordination, rather than enforceable labor obligations and corrective action requirements for noncompliance, undermines its ability to address persistent child labor in cocoa production. Bridging the gap between internationally recognized child labor protections and effective legal recourse requires mechanisms that hold participating governments accountable for persistent failures to protect children.

II. The International Cocoa Agreement and its Legal Framework

The ICA does not adequately integrate the enforcement of labor standards into its institutional responsibilities, instead prioritizing economic coordination.6 It contains a structural limitation—the international framework governing cocoa production prioritizes economic coordination without adequately integrating the enforcement of labor standards into its institutional responsibilities.7

International labor law provides a framework in order to address this deficiency. The International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Minimum Age Convention in 1973, adopted by the International Labour Conference in Geneva, requires states to pursue the effective abolition of child labor through legislation establishing minimum employment ages and standards to ensure compliance.8 Additionally, the ILO’s Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention in 1999 requires participating states to implement legislative requirements, including prohibitions against forced labor and hazardous employment involving children, as well as penalties for violations.9 Furthermore, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989, recognizes under Article 32 children’s rights to protection from economic exploitation and hazardous employment.10 These measures demonstrate that the international community has previously established substantive standards against which labor practices can be regulated.11

Nevertheless, the existence of these standards does not guarantee their implementation throughout the cocoa supply chain.12 This failure is illustrated in Ghana, which ratified the ILO’s Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention in 2000 and the Minimum Age Convention in 2011. Nonetheless, in 2020, approximately 55% of children ages five to seven in Ghanaian households within the cocoa-growing regions were engaged in child labor in cocoa production, with 51% performing hazardous work.13 Consequently, international cocoa governance remains institutionally disconnected from the labor protections that should inform its operation.14 The ICA’s weakness lies not in the absence of international labor law, but rather its failure to integrate accountability into the industry itself. The effectiveness of international commodity provisions depends on their institutional design and the willingness of participating governments to implement agreed-upon objectives.15 Yet, as compliance depends primarily on government willingness, international cooperation can produce commitments without ensuring their implementation. The consequences of this enforcement gap are evident in the continued prevalence of hazardous child labor in cocoa production.

III. Reforming International Cocoa Law

Meaningful reform requires integrating labor responsibility into international cocoa governance without treating the ICA as a substitute for national labor law or existing international treaties. Participating governments must establish measurable national action plans consistent with applicable international labor standards.16 These plans must identify responsible agencies, establish implementation deadlines, and require regular reporting. Such obligations would provide a clearer basis for evaluating whether governments are implementing their commitments rather than merely endorsing them. Moreover, the ICA should incorporate graduated consequences for persistent noncompliance. Initial responses could include technical assistance and corrective action plans, while repeated failures could trigger formal compliance reviews and proportionate institutional consequences expressly authorized by the agreement.17 The effectiveness of such enforcement mechanisms can be illustrated through the 2023 case involving Packers Sanitation Services Inc. (PSSI), a sanitation contractor in the U.S. meatpacking industry. An investigation revealed at least 102 illegally employed children in hazardous working conditions across 13 facilities in the United States. The U.S. Department of Labor ultimately secured a court order that required the company to comply with child labor legislation and employ a compliance specialist, as well as pay approximately $1.54 million in civil penalties.18 Applying similar principles to international cocoa governance could provide a mechanism for holding governments accountable.

Crucially, accountability must also address the role of private companies, such as Mars Incorporated, within the cocoa supply chain. Mars, the manufacturer behind several chocolate brands like Snickers and M&M’s, had come under fire in 2023 after an investigation in Ghana. It was revealed that children as young as five years old were engaging in exploitative labor practices on cocoa farms that would supply cocoa to Mars, despite the company’s previous public condemnation of child labor.19 Therefore, governments must strengthen domestic requirements for companies to investigate the labor practices of cocoa farms and suppliers, requiring companies to identify hazardous child labor and investigate documented violations. These requirements should be accompanied by procedures addressing the economic conditions that lead to the persistence of child labor. Possible solutions could include improved educational access, stronger social services, and sustainable farmer incomes.20 Combining enforceable obligations with targeted assistance would address both the institutional failures that permit exploitation and the underlying conditions that sustain it.

IV. Conclusion

The International Cocoa Agreement illustrates the limitations of international cooperation when economic objectives are not accompanied by sufficiently effective accountability mechanisms. Although international law establishes protections against child labor, the persistence of hazardous working conditions demonstrates that recognizing legal standards is not equivalent to ensuring their enforcement. The ICA’s reliance on economic coordination and cooperation leaves a significant gap between international commitments and practical compliance. Therefore, reform must incorporate measurable obligations, independent monitoring, and proportionate consequences for persistent noncompliance. Without such changes, international cocoa governance risks continuing to prioritize cooperation over compliance, leaving internationally recognized child labor protections insufficiently enforced.

  1. Sadhu et al., Assessing Progress in Reducing Child Labor in Cocoa Production in Cocoa Growing Areas of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, Univ. of Chi. (2020). ↩︎
  2. Kathryn Khamsi, 2010 International Cocoa Agreement, 50 I.L.M. 669 (2011). ↩︎
  3. Richard H. Goldman, The International Cocoa Agreement and the World Cocoa Economy (Cornell Univ., Dep’t of Agric. Econ., Staff Paper No. 74-2, 1974). ↩︎
  4. The International Labour Organization’s Minimum Age Convention (1973) is a treaty establishing an international framework that requires ratifying states to pursue the elimination of child labor by setting minimum employment ages and adopting policies to protect children from premature entry into the workforce. ↩︎
  5. Elliot J. Schrage & Anthony P. Ewing, The Cocoa Industry and Child Labour, 18 J. of Corp. Citizenship 99 (2005). ↩︎
  6. Christopher L. Gilbert, International Commodity Agreements: Design and Performance, 15 World Dev. 591 (1987). ↩︎
  7. Id. ↩︎
  8. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1–2, 9. ↩︎
  9. Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour arts. 1, 3, 7, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161. ↩︎
  10. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 32, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. ↩︎
  11. The International Labour Organization’s Worst Form of Child Labour Convention (1999) identifies particularly severe forms of child labor requiring immediate prohibition and elimination. This includes slavery, child trafficking, and hazardous work that is likely to harm the child’s health or safety. ↩︎
  12. Id. ↩︎
  13. Id. ↩︎
  14. Haeun Lee & Mi Sun Park, Transformation of the Global Governance in the Cocoa Sector with Three Characteristics: Diversification, Flexibilization, and Coordination, 153, Forest Pol’y & Econ. 102977 (2023). ↩︎
  15. Tetteh A. Kofi, The International Cocoa Agreements, 11 J. World Trade L. 37 (1977). ↩︎
  16. Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The Politics of International Commodity Regulation: The Negotiation and Operation of the International Cocoa Agreements, 5 Third World Q. 386, 386-417 (1983). ↩︎
  17. Matthew Trevisani, Cocoa Crisis: Cartelizing West African Cocoa in Response to the Persistent Use of Child Labor, 24 Chi. J. Int’l L. 477 (2024). ↩︎
  18. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., More Than 100 Children Illegally Employed in Hazardous Jobs, Federal Investigation Finds; Food Sanitation Contractor Pays $1.5M in Penalties (Feb. 2023), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20230217-1?utm_ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
  19. Debora Patta et al., Candy Company Mars Uses Cocoa Harvested by Kids as Young as 5 in Ghana: CBS News Investigation, CBS News (Nov. 2023), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/children-harvesting-cocoa-used-by-major-corporations-ghana/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
  20. Diva Putri Nur Shafira, Sweet Treat, Bitter Truth: Examining the Practice of Forced Child Labor in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana’s Cocoa Industry, ResearchGate (Mar. 2026), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/401384708_Sweet_Treat_Bitter_Truth_Examining_the_Practice_of_Forced_Child_Labor_in_Cote_d’Ivoire_and_Ghana’s_Cocoa_Industry (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎

Comments

Leave a Reply