Undergraduate Law Review at Florida State University

Examining the Constitutionality of Trump’s Sweeping Tariffs and Observing the Legal and Financial Impacts

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Undergraduate Law Review at FSU
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Writer: Isabelle Kim 

Article Editor: Alexandra Falvella

Associate Editors: Claire Lowenstein & Kelsie Fernandez

Disclaimer: This piece was finalized prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump; therefore, it does not address the Court’s opinion or its potential impact on the issues discussed.

I. Introduction 

    On April 2, 2025, President Donald J. Trump announced Executive Order 14257, an amendment imposing duties on countries involved in the synthetic opioid supply chain, under the authority of further modification from previous executive orders.1 Since its implementation on April 5, the tariff policies have increased universally as a 10 percent importation tariff and country-specific reciprocal tariffs.2 The Trump Administration’s imposition of tariffs as a tool to support a protectionist economic approach exceeds the authority granted under the Constitution, violates the Nondelegation Clause and the Major Questions Doctrine, and has created substantial economic costs that outweigh any purported benefits, rendering these tariffs unlawful and economically adverse.3

    II. History and Use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)

      President Nixon issued Proclamation 4074 in 1971, imposing a 10% ad valorem (according to value) tariff that was within the broad discretion found in the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA). The direct link between the proclamation and TWEA was decided in United States v. Yoshida International Inc. (1975), Yoshida II.4 Consequently, President Nixon’s invocation of the TWEA contributed to the enactment of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) as a measure to address growing concerns regarding the president’s broad, unchecked power. Enacted on December 28, 1977, the IEEPA imposed stipulations to restrict the presidential authority to declare a state of emergency and invoke broad powers in the TWEA to regulate and restrict trade during times of war or declared national emergencies.5 According to the IEEPA, a state of emergency “may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.”6 Upon the declaration of such a time period, the President is required to submit a report to Congress detailing five criteria.7 Congress holds the power to terminate the state of emergency through a joint resolution while the President may veto this law.8 On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump declared a state of emergency to address that “America’s sovereignty is under attack.”9 This declaration did not deem the threat extraordinary or unusual, as prescribed through the IEEPA. In February, President Trump declared three more proclamations, expanding the state of emergency previously proclaimed in January, to then address failures from Canada, Mexico, and China as an extraordinary and unusual threat.10 Historically, presidential authority to declare a national emergency has been limited to specific, singular incidents while Trump’s executive orders extend past his initial proclamation. Invoking the right to authorize “unlimited tariffs” is an unheralded act by President Trump as the invocation of IEEPA powers from previous presidents historically froze assets, blocked financial transfers, placed embargoes, or imposed target sanctions. This departure from precedent is not only illegal, but incites financial consequences.

      III. The Trump Administration’s Protectionist Approach

        Protectionism was adopted into the United States’ fiscal policy through Alexander Hamilton, who believed the implementation of domestic tariffs would raise government revenue and stimulate the domestic economy.11 The foundational concept of shielding domestic industries from global competition through regulation of international trade promotes domestic consumption by increasing the cost of importing foreign goods.12 Consequently, the United States faced immediate retaliatory tariffs from foreign nations, subsequently decreasing domestic revenue and the long-run GDP by an estimated 0.7%.13 On March 24, 2020, during President Trump’s first term and amidst a coronavirus-induced financial crisis, he proclaimed, “…Our goal for the future must be to have American medicine for American patients, American supplies for American hospitals, and American equipment for our great American heroes.”14 The vision for the American future illustrated in President Trump’s speech demonstrates the protectionist ideology which prioritizes the interests of oneself through legislation that insulates domestic industries from the global market. The Great Depression, the historic national emergency declared by Franklin D. Roosevelt, implemented trade restriction strategies such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act to protect domestic businesses. However, the retaliatory tariffs which ensued slashed global trade and exacerbated economic contraction.15 Though historical evidence alone cannot forecast future economic activities, economists such as Paul Krugman assert that Trump’s executive orders to impose tariffs will make America “considerably poorer.”16 

        Notable patterns that typically follow the implementation of protectionist legislation include a decrease in consumer bargaining power which diminishes economic stimulation. Higher prices not only discourage spending, but retaliatory tariffs will create fewer sales to foreign countries. Excise taxes of specific goods can swiftly raise government revenue; yet this strategy is commonly used by smaller, less developed countries with an urgent need for funds and a population with relatively small discretionary spending activity.17 By implementing legislation which directly harms global trade, President Trump’s legislation diminishes America’s ability to specialize within the global economy. 

        IV. Consolidated Challenges Against Imposed Tariffs – US Supreme Court 

          Upon the announcement of Trump’s executive orders, numerous suits have arisen from state governments and large corporations alike. Among these challenges is V.O.S. Selections Inc. v. Trump (2025), and Learning Resources v. Trump (2026) has been consolidated and is currently awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision. Primarily, the plaintiff argues based upon the magnitude of the Reciprocal Tariffs and Trafficking Tariffs, noted to “generate between $2.3 trillion and $3.3 trillion over the budget window.”18 The President must provide clear authorization to unilaterally impose tariffs that are deemed “significant.”19 In response, the executive branch asserts the congressional authorization found in the IEEPA; both sides scrutinize the phrase, “regulate…importation” to determine the lawfulness of the President’s policies following his executive orders.20 The defendant asserts that due to Yoshida II, an existing precedent at the time of the IEEPA’s enactment, Congress intended to grant the President broad authority during national emergencies including the regulation of tariffs. As language from the IEEPA was “directly drawn” from the TWEA, it is true that “when Congress ‘adopt[s] the language used in [an] earlier act,’ we presume that Congress ‘adopted also the construction given by this Court to such language, and made it a part of the enactment.’”21 The defense presumes Congress’s awareness of the Yoshida II precedent upon the enactment of the IEEPA. Thus, the phrase “regulate…importation” logically extends the Presidential power to levy tariffs. However, even with the application of Yoshida II upon the enactment of the IEEPA, the court of appeals differentiated President Nixon’s tariffs from President Trump’s as the former was limited in time, scope, amount, and directly related to the declared national emergency. Contrastingly, President Trump’s tariffs lack sufficient linkage to substantiate their implementation on behalf of threats posed by illicit drugs.22 The court of appeals observed the “Government’s ‘pressure’ argument to effectively concede that the direct effect of the country-specific tariffs is simply to burden the countries they target’ and while that may be an effective diplomatic strategy, it does not meet the statutory standard of ‘deal with’ an emergency.”23 This severed the link between the imposition of tariffs and the announced state of emergency, terminating any authority under the IEEPA.

          The court of appeals held that in previous tariff specific statutes, precise, explicit phrasing is used to transfer the Congressional power, as expressed in the U.S. Constitution, of levying tariffs to the President and the lack of such within the IEEPA suggests there was no intention to grant authority. The Major Questions Doctrine, established in West Virginia v. EPA, ​under which doctrine the EPA determined, “a clear statement is necessary for a court to conclude that Congress intended to delegate authority ‘of this breadth to regulate a fundamental sector of the economy.”24 Thus, President Trump’s IEEPA tariffs require the government to cite indisputable constitutional authorization of the power to levy tariffs due to its breadth and impact. This has not been done. The Nondelegation Doctrine, a constitutional principle, works in tandem with the Major Questions Doctrine to affirm that Congress cannot yield its Article I legislative powers, including the power to levy tariffs to the executive branch.25 By distinguishing between “necessary” coordinating among the three branches and unlawful encroachment upon the “constitutional field” of another branch, it is evident broad and significant tariff policies are powers reserved for the bicameral legislative process.26

          V. Conclusion

            As a result of the immense alterations to the United States’ foreign trade policy in pursuit of a protectionist economic agenda, domestic consumers and producers alike experience a shrinkage in economic activity. While such policies were implemented to encourage domestic buying, economists have observed based on brand loyalty and psychological buying factors, many Americans have opted to continue to import foreign goods and retain importation costs, resulting in a net decrease of 40,000 manufacturing jobs.27 Revenue earned from the tariffs directly benefits the United States Government while citizens bear an average of $1,200 in extra annual costs.28 The president overreaches powers granted through the U.S. Constitution and encroaches upon Congressional legislative powers, protected through the Nondelegation Clause and Major Questions Doctrine to perpetuate a harmful protectionist strategy.

            1. Exec. Order No. 14,257, 87 Fed. Reg. 19, 339 (Feb. 2025). ↩︎
            2. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1708. ↩︎
            3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. ↩︎
            4. United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975). ↩︎
            5. 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4341. ↩︎
            6. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b). ↩︎
            7. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(b). This requires the President to report to Congress: (1) the circumstances necessitating the exercise of authority; (2) why those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat; (3) the authorities to be exercised; (4) why such actions are necessary; and (5) the foreign countries involved). ↩︎
            8. 50 U.S.C. § 1622. ↩︎
            9. Proclamation No. 10,886, 90 Fed. Reg. 1 (Jan. 20, 2025). ↩︎
            10. Exec. Order No. 14,193; Exec. Order No. 14,194; Exec. Order No. 14,195. ↩︎
            11. Jose E. Alvarez, Alexander Hamilton’s Defense of Foreign Capital, Inst. for Int’l L. and Just., https://www.iilj.org/working-papers/alexander-hamiltons-defense-foreign-capital/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            12. U.S. Dep’t of State, Off. of the Historian Protectionism in the Interwar Period, Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/protectionism (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            13. Alex Durante & Erica York, Trump Tariffs: Tracking the Economic Impact of the Trump Trade War, Tax Found. (Feb. 2026), https://taxfoundation.org/research/all/federal/trump-tariffs-trade-war/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            14. Press Briefing by President Trump, Vice President Pence, & Members of the Coronavirus Task Force, The White House (Mar. 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-10/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            15. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202 et seq. (2023). ↩︎
            16. Steve Inskeep, Economist Paul Krugman on the Impact of Trump’s Tariffs, NPR (Aug. 2025), https://www.npr.org/2025/08/07/nx-s1-5494574/economist-paul-krugman-on-the-impact-of-trumps-tariffs#:~:text=Whether%20it%20actually%20crosses%20the,already%20starting%20to%20see%20that (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            17. Jay Garg, The Politics of Protectionism, Harv. Pol. Rev. (Apr. 2020),  https://harvardpolitics.com/politics-of-protectionism/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            18. FACT: One, Big, Beautiful Bill Cuts Spending, Fuels Growth, The White House (May 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/05/fact-one-big-beautiful-bill-cuts-spending-fuels-growth/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            19. Kelly McGee, The Major Questions Doctrine Applies to President Trump’s Tariffs, Yale J. on Regul. (May 2025), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-major-questions-doctrine-applies-to-president-trumps-tariffs-by-kelly-mcgee/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            20. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701. ↩︎
            21. Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 590 U.S. 255, 270 (2020). ↩︎
            22. Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Addresses Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba, White House (Jan. 2026),
              https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-addresses-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-cuba/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            23. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1812 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2025). ↩︎
            24. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022). ↩︎
            25. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. ↩︎
            26. Cong. Rsch. Serv., Overview of Nondelegation Doctrine, Constitution Annotated, art. I, § 1, cl. 1,
              https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S1-5-1/ALDE_00000014/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review). ↩︎
            27. Scott Horsley, Trump’s Tariffs Could Bring “Havoc” for Importers and Raise Prices, NPR (Nov. 2025),
              https://www.npr.org/2025/11/05/nx-s1-5596488/tariffs-trump-economy-inflation (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
            28. American Families Have Already Paid Nearly $1,200 Each in Tariff Costs Since Trump Entered Office, Joint Econ. Comm. Democrats (Dec. 2025), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democrats/2025/12/new-american-families-have-already-paid-nearly-1-200-each-in-tariff-costs-since-trump-entered-office (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎

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