The Case for Continued United States Non-Ratification of UNCLOS: Balancing Sovereignty with Global Maritime Interests 

Writer: Olivia Hill 

Article Editor: Chasann Samuels 

Associate Editors: Dina Fakhar & Leona Rindle

I. Introduction

For over four decades, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has remained the foundation of international ocean law, establishing a legal framework to govern navigational rights, extraction of resources, and the environmental protection of the oceans.¹ The United States played an immense role in formulating the treaty during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, yet consecutive administrations have declined to formally join the treaty.² The decision not to ratify dates to 1982, when President Ronald Reagan refused to accept the final version of the treaty over concerns with the deep-seabed mining section in Part XI.³ The government established the International Seabed Authority (ISA) as a transnational body with immense regulatory and redistributive powers, such as enforced profit-sharing and technology transfer duties that were seen as conflicting with United States free-market principles.⁴ Although the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI sought to address multiple concerns by eliminating the most objectionable aspects of the treaty, the United States has continued to maintain its non-party status.⁵ As of February 2026, 170 states and the European Union have agreed to the convention, while the United States continues to operate outside of the convention’s structure.⁶

This article supports the idea that the United States’ non-ratification is still the most desirable course of action. By recognizing the treaty’s navigational and high-seas freedoms as conventional international law, the United States assures that it obtains many of the practical benefits of UNCLOS without surrendering to the ISA’s authority or to required dispute settlement devices that could restrain the military and economic autonomy.⁷ Recent domestic regulatory developments, combined with the stalled progress of the ISA’s Mining Code, further demonstrate that the current approach of the United States efficiently balances sovereignty with vigorous engagement in the governance of maritime issues.⁸

II. Historical Development of UNCLOS and the Basis for United States Non-Ratification

UNCLOS was a result of extended negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s to organize the governance of the ocean due to disputes related to resources and navigation.⁹ The treaty officially entered into force in 1994 alongside 60 ratifications.¹⁰ President Ronald Reagan’s decision not to sign the treaty in 1982 was a result of Part XI, which created the ISA to manage seabed mining past national jurisdiction, with requirements for sharing profits, transferring technology, and controlling markets.¹¹ These aspects were viewed as supporting non-market systems and establishing excessive bureaucracy.¹² The 1994 Agreement alleviated issues by removing mandatory transfers, lessening financial obligations, and refining the industrialized states’ Council role.¹³ The United States signed and recognizes most UNCLOS adjustments as customary international law.¹⁴ However, the consent for ratification by the Senate has not yet occurred due to concerns related to sovereignty, potential tribunal jurisdiction over the United States’ actions, and burdens on certain institutions.¹⁵ 

As of 2026, the United States conforms with customary portions through domestic law, naval operations, and protests.¹⁶ This position has continued across administrations, treating navigation and laws that are related as binding customary standards without holding party status.¹⁷ The decision not to ratify the treaty results from concerns towards multilateral constraints on flexibility in certain regions such as the Arctic and Indo-Pacific, where challenges to the standards arise.¹⁸

III. Sovereignty Implications of Ratification: Constraints on National Autonomy

Ratification of UNCLOS would put the United States under the authority of the ISA for deep-seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction.¹⁹ The ISA oversees investigation and development and mandates the sharing of profits, which could restrict company autonomy.²⁰ Entities of the United States operate under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, avoiding ISA fees and redistribution.²¹ On January 21, 2026, NOAA’s final rule consolidated license processes, which quickened permitting for critical minerals.²² United States companies submitted consolidated applications for Clarion-Clipperton Zone activities, with comments through February 23, 2026.²³ Mandatory dispute resolution could expose the United States’ military and navigational actions to courts, restricting operations in contested areas such as the South China Sea or the Arctic.²⁴ This risks subjecting decisions to international bodies, which could limit the responses to aggressive claims.²⁵ Binding processes could hinder unilateral rights assertions where fast naval action could eliminate threats.²⁶

Advocates explain that ratification of the treaty benefits continental shelf claims, but the United States handles these through customary law and domestic means.²⁷ Joining UNCLOS adds constraints to the United States without any gains, specifically with ISA Mining Code talks unresolved into the 31st session (i.e., February-July 2026). There are still no clear timelines related to adoption amidst environmental debate.²⁸

IV. Benefits Accumulated Under Customary International Law: Real Advantages of Non-Party Status

The primary rules of UNCLOS include the freedom of navigation, overflight, and strait transit, creating customary international law that binds all states.²⁹ The United States Navy exercises these through FONOPs excessive claims in the South China Sea.³⁰ Operations near Scarborough Shoal in 2025 asserted Philippine rights and escalated tensions, enforcing maritime claims without relying on the ratification of UNCLOS.³¹ The primary rules of UNCLOS sustain open sea lanes that are important for trade and mobility, with customary status that provides flexibility.³² 

The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act allows independent deep-seabed exploration, without following the rules of the ISA.³³ Bilateral alliances ensure that interests in the Arctic and South China Sea are protected through presence and protests.³⁴ Non-ratification of the treaty assures that burdens, fees, and forum lawsuits are avoided, while customary compliance assures practical gains.³⁵ The United States’ recognition that these primary navigational freedoms reflect customary international law allows enforcement of these freedoms without assuming the treaty’s full obligations, which supports flexible adaptation to threats such as illegal fishing.³⁶ Consistent FONOPs and domestic initiatives reveal efficiency in preserving freedom.³⁷

V. Balancing Sovereignty Preservation with Maritime Security and Resource Interests

Remaining in a non-party status ensures unilateral adaptation to arising challenges, such as mining technologies and security threats.³⁸ The Navy ensures maritime security through power projection and enforcement operations, such as those conducted in the South China Sea.³⁹ Independence from UNCLOS assures that multilateral delays or vetoes in ISA processes are avoided.⁴⁰ Ratification of UNCLOS could restrict the flexibility of the military in waters that are disputed, while remaining in a non-party status maintains autonomy under customary compliance.⁴¹ This approach enables United States leadership through naval power, innovation under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, and crucial diplomacy, without transferring authority to international bodies during continuous delays at the International Seabed Authority.⁴² Domestic regulation offers confidence as it encourages investment in defense-critical minerals without redistribution.⁴³

VI. Strategic and Economic Aspects in the Modern Maritime Environment

Sea power competition is growing in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic, with emerging claims that conflict with customary compliance.⁴⁴ Non-ratification offers strategic leeway against challenges.⁴⁵ FONOPs excessive baselines and militarization without tribunal risks help to control situations in contested waters.⁴⁶ Economically, the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act’s 2026 revisions position United States firms to more effectively secure seabed mineral resources that are necessary for batteries, renewable energy technologies, and applications of defense.⁴⁷ Participation in the ISA’s rules would subject the United States’ operations to mandatory profit-sharing requirements that could delay development and direct profits overseas.⁴⁸ Non-ratification promotes customary law through practice. Persistent FONOPs, protests, and partnerships enforce favored high seas interpretations that align with the law and the interests of the United States.⁴⁹

VII. Conclusion

Continued United States non-ratification of UNCLOS assures that sovereignty is safe as maritime concerns advance. By applying key aspects of customary international law, the United States secures navigational freedoms, access to resources, and removes the burdens of the ISA. This balances independence with the stability of the oceans, supporting leadership through the strength of the Navy, and diplomacy instead of treaty ties. Developments as of February 2026, such as the stalled discussion at the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and advancing U.S. domestic efforts, enable the United States to manage maritime issues independently without formally joining UNCLOS. 

1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. ↩︎
2. Law of the Sea Convention, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (July 2025), https://www.noaa.gov/law-of-sea-convention (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
3. President Ronald Reagan, Statement on United States Actions Related to the Conference on the Law of the Sea (July 9, 1982). ↩︎
4. UNCLOS, supra note 1, pt. XI. ↩︎
5. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3. ↩︎
6. Implementing Agreements Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (Jan. 20, 2026). ↩︎
7. NOAA, supra note 2. ↩︎
8. Deep Seabed Mining: Revisions to Regulations for Exploration License and Commercial Recovery Permit Applications, 91 Fed. Reg. 2642 (Jan. 21, 2026). ↩︎
9. UNCLOS, supra note 1. ↩︎
10. Id. art. 308. ↩︎
11. Reagan, supra note 3. ↩︎
12. UNCLOS, supra note 1, pt. XI. ↩︎
13. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI, supra note 5. ↩︎
14. NOAA, supra note 2. ↩︎
15. Cong. Rsch. Serv., supra note 6. ↩︎
16. Id. ↩︎
17. Id. ↩︎
18. Id. ↩︎
19. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 137. ↩︎
20. Id. ↩︎
21. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1980). ↩︎
22. Deep Seabed Mining: Revisions to Regulations, 91 Fed. Reg. at 2642. ↩︎
23. Notice of Receipt of Applications for Deep Seabed Mining Exploration Licenses and Commercial Recovery Permits, 90 Fed. Reg. 60064 (Dec. 23, 2025). ↩︎
24. UNCLOS, supra note 1, pt. XV. ↩︎
25. Cong. Rsch. Serv., supra note 6. ↩︎
26. Id. ↩︎
27. Frequently Asked Questions—U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/faq-us-ecs-project (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
28. Draft Exploitation Regulations, Int’l Seabed Auth., https://isa.org.jm/the-mining-code/draft-exploitation-regulations-2/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
29. Limits in the Seas No. 112 – United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims, U.S. Dep’t of State (1992). ↩︎
30. USS Mobile conducts Maritime Cooperative Activity with BRP Ramon Alcaraz, U.S. Navy (Aug. 2024), https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3858406/uss-mobile-conducts-maritime-cooperative-activity-with-brp-ramon-alcaraz/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
31. Id. ↩︎
32. NOAA, supra note 2.  ↩︎
33. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1980).  ↩︎
34. Cong. Rsch. Serv., supra note 6. ↩︎
35. Id. ↩︎
36. Limits in the Seas No. 112, supra note 29. ↩︎
37. Id. ↩︎
38. Deep Seabed Mining, NOAA, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/deep-seabed-mining/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
39. USS Mobile Conducts Maritime Cooperative Activity with BRP Ramon Alcaraz, U.S. Navy (Aug. 2024), https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3858406/uss-mobile-conducts-maritime-cooperative-activity-with-brp-ramon-alcaraz/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
40. Int’l Seabed Auth., supra note 28. ↩︎
41. Cong. Rsch. Serv., supra note 6. ↩︎
42. Deep Seabed Mining: Revisions to Regulations, 91 Fed. Reg. at 2642. ↩︎
43. Id. ↩︎
44. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, U.S. Dep’t of Defense (Dec. 18, 2024). ↩︎
45. Id. ↩︎
46. Id. ↩︎
47. Deep Seabed Mining: Revisions to Regulations, 91 Fed. Reg. at 2642. ↩︎
48. Mining Code, Int’l Seabed Auth., https://isa.org.jm/the-mining-code/ (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
49. Limits in the Seas No. 112, supra note 29. ↩︎