Writer: Abigail Duffee
Article Editor: Joe Daniels
Associate Editor: Alaina Babb
I. Introduction
Although some federal courts have historically required majority-group plaintiffs to establish “background circumstances” in employment discrimination cases,1 the Supreme Court has decided to eliminate this requirement. The Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services2 decision may change employment anti-discrimination measures and cause individuals to question the legitimacy of minority hires.
II. Title VII and Employment Discrimination Cases
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 prohibits employers from refusing to employ or discharge any individual because of their race, religion, sex or national origin.4 When one files a complaint under Title VII, they obtain the burden of establishing a prima facie case5 by fulfilling the McDonnell Douglas test.6 The exact language of the test’s first requirement is that the complainant must “belong to a racial minority,”7 but it shifted over time8 to being a member of a protected class so this principle could be applied in other cases.9 Reverse discrimination10 plaintiffs had no way to meet this first requirement, as they are not members of a protected class. This is defined by the Cornell Legal Information Institute as a category of individuals identified by characteristics such as race, color, national origin, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, age, and disability that are legally safeguarded from discrimination or retaliation under federal or state law.11 So, in their ruling on Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals furthered the definition to include majority group plaintiffs by allowing the protected class requirement to be replaced with background circumstances.12 The background circumstances burden, as outlined in Parker, is the burden to prove “the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”13 The court defends this replacement by stating this “evidence of a racially discriminatory environment,”14 serves “as a functional equivalent of the first McDonnell Douglas criterion.”15
III. Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services
The plaintiff in the Ames case, Marlean Ames, is a heterosexual employee who sought a promotion for which she applied and interviewed, but was not hired.16 The position was then held open for eight months, before going to a homosexual employee who did not apply or interview.17 Later, Ms. Ames was removed from her position and replaced by another gay employee, who had also neither applied nor interviewed for the position.18 The Sixth Circuit ruled Ms. Ames had not established a prima facie case, having filled all requirements but the first,19 which was to provide background evidence that the defendant is the unusual employer.20
As a result, when this case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the question before the Court became whether or not the background circumstances requirement was necessary as mandated. The Court ruled it was not, as the requirement “cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.”21 The Court identified two main problems with the requirement: it imposed a heightened evidentiary standard on majority-group plaintiffs and conflicted with precedent requiring flexibility in the prima facie inquiry.22 Justice Jackson defended this by explaining that the background circumstances requirement forces majority group plaintiffs to provide “the same, highly specific evidentiary standard in every case,”23 making their prima facie burden inflexible. Her second point concluded that the explicit wording of having a burden in addition to the standard measure was unjust.24 Jackson argued that the wording of background circumstances as an addition reveals it cannot be an equivalent requirement, and is therefore unfair.
This rationale has many complications. In Justice Jackson’s opinion, she mentions two ways to satisfy the background circumstances requirement: affirm that a member of the discussed minority group made the employment decision or demonstrate a pattern of discrimination against members of the discussed majority group.25 Considering that the background circumstances requirement can shift based on a broadly defined majority or minority group, these two options are relatively lenient and flexible. Na’Quan Bush, a J.D. Candidate at Howard University School of Law, highlights the irony of eradicating a requirement that was created to allow flexibility on the basis of it being intransigent. He writes that “the background circumstances requirement embodied this flexibility by adapting prima facie showings to different factual situations,” and therefore proves this requirement embodies the Court’s instruction to avoid inflexibility in the establishment of prima facie cases.26 As stated previously, this requirement is not an additional burden, but a requirement added in order to allow majority group plaintiffs to satisfy the first burden of the McDonnell Douglas test. It is proven equal, considering these protected class members statistically have more discrimination initiated against them. Title VII was intended to protect these minority groups, so this equivalent requirement is in line with its original intent. Therefore, the understanding of this standard reveals it is an equivalent burden added for use by majority group plaintiffs.
IV. Precedent Set and Consequent Results
The precedent set by this decision will have two main results for employment discrimination cases. By eradicating the majority group equivalent to the first requirement of the McDonnell Douglas test, it sets the standard that it is removed for majority group complainants. The idea that eradicating background circumstances will set majority and minority plaintiffs on equal ground is harmful in that it does not acknowledge that members of historically marginalized groups statistically face higher rates of discrimination than majority groups.27 If McDonnell aims to be a proper evidentiary test, it must address that discrimination disproportionately affects certain populations.28 Therefore, as this case’s precedent puts both groups on symmetrical grounds, it feeds into a discriminatory problem. By removing the requirement for majority group plaintiffs to provide further evidence that an employer was acting discriminately, majority group plaintiffs can more easily claim minority group members were illegitimate hires made to increase workforce diversity. Many fear this reversal for majority group plaintiffs to establish their outlying or proven higher-risk protected characteristic will jeopardize affirmative action plans and designate inclusive programming in workplaces as discriminatory.29 Eradicating this leveling principle will allow complainants to “suggest that every promotion or hiring of a minority-group member is presumptively suspect.”30 In all, this ruling may harm members of protected classes, as their employment can now be labelled as discrimination against majority group members. Discrimination law needs to be reformed to better reflect societal shifts; however, this ruling does not provide a solution.
- Na’Quan Bush, Remedial Statutes and Formal Equality: The Undermining of Title VII’s Core Function, 10 How. Hum. & C.R. L. Rev. 155 (2026). ↩︎
- Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303 (2025). ↩︎
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. ↩︎
- Id. § 2000e-2. ↩︎
- Establishing a prima facie case refers to the plaintiff’s duty to establish evidence supporting their claim that reallocates the burden of proof to the defendant. ↩︎
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 792-793 (1973). The test is composed of four requirements that the plaintiff must fulfill in order to shift the burden of proof. They are as follows: “(i) he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) he applied and was qualified for a job the employer was trying to fill; (iii) though qualified, he was rejected; and (iv) thereafter the employer continued to seek applicants with complainant’s qualifications.” ↩︎
- Id. at 793. ↩︎
- See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (establishing flexibility of the requirements); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (further shifting language of McDonnell’s first requirement to fit a gender discrimination case). ↩︎
- James Poindexter, McDonnell Douglas — The “Interloper” on the Ropes, 99 Fla. B.J. 32 (2025). ↩︎
- See Reverse Discrimination, Wex, LII / Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/reverse_discrimination (May 2024) (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). (Defining “reverse discrimination” as a claim by an individual in a non-protected class that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, or other characteristics or attributes). ↩︎
- Protected Class, Wex, LII / Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/reverse_discrimination (May 2024) (on file with the Undergraduate Law Review at FSU). ↩︎
- Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981). ↩︎
- Id. ↩︎
- Id. at 1018. ↩︎
- Id. ↩︎
- Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303 (2025) (No. 23-1039). ↩︎
- Id. at 3. ↩︎
- Id. at 4. ↩︎
- Id. ↩︎
- Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981). ↩︎
- Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303 (2025). ↩︎
- Id. at 6. ↩︎
- Id. at 7. ↩︎
- Id. at 8. ↩︎
- Id. at 3. ↩︎
- Bush, supra note 1, at 191. ↩︎
- Civil Rights Act of 1964 — Title VII — Reverse Discrimination — Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 139 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 365 (2025). ↩︎
- Id. ↩︎
- Maayan Sudai & Lihi Yona, After Identity: Reverse Discrimination, Anti-Essentialism, and the Future of Title VII, 78 SMU L. Rev. 881, 892 (2025). ↩︎
- Id. ↩︎

Leave a Reply